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The primacy of self-interested individuals is often regarded as the
appropriatebasisfor US social spending decisions. One thread of
this argument has advanced age-based self-interest and politically
powerful elderly to explain why Social Security and Medicare have
thrived in a policy environment that has seen retrenchment in
other programs. We argue that crude self-interest and individual
programs considered in isolation are insufficient to understand
social spending preferences. We use General Social Survey data to
contrast conventional and critical explanationsfor understanding
the role of age in preferences for social spending. Factor analyses
demonstrate that social spending preferences cluster into conceptually distinctive domains. This supports our argument that social
spending orientationsare more complex than conventional analyses of age-based preferencesfor single-issue discrete programs like
education, welfare or Social Security suggest. Overemphasis on age
group differences misconstrues the role of age in spending orientations and whether preferences are more plausibly labeled as selfinterested or altruistic. Consideringhow age, period and cohorts
dfferences impact social spending domains improves understanding of how the life course influences social spending preferences.
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Since the mid-1970s, most domestic federal social spending in the United States has been under siege. Critics of government's role in providing public goods and services have
argued that all social spending must be retrenched. Within this
antistatist political climate (Quadagno and Street 2005), social
welfare programs (such as the former Aid For Families with
Dependent Children, now replaced by Temporary Assistance
to Needy Families) targeted toward poor children and working
age citizens have been particularly hard hit by retrenchment
and budget cuts (Mink 1998; Marmor, Cook and Scher 1997;
Estes, Linkins, and Binney 1996). During the same period and
despite claims by some that the 'welfare state for the elderly'
(Myles 1989) is unaffordable (Lamm 1999; Howe 1997; Peterson
1994) cuts to broad-based programs like Social Security and
Medicare have been made only at the margins. Despite recent
political rhetoric urging partial privatization of those programs
(Quadagno and Street 2006), spending on these two age-based
programs dwarfs federal spending on all other domestic social
programs combined (United States House of Representatives
2004).
A relatively straightforward way to interpret recent social
spending trajectories is to adopt a conventional analytic approach that asserts self-interest based on single issue politicslike support for public education or opposition to welfare- as
the foundation for spending preferences (see Campbell 2002;
MacManus 1996). Certainly, individuals can identify particular
programs they favor or dislike, even when they are uncertain
of program details and specifics (Kuklinski, Quirk, Schweider,
and Rich 1998). A more holistic approach to understanding social spending preference structures, however, would
account for generalized orientations towards types of social
spending rather than assessing particular social programs in
isolation (Kohli 1996). In contrast to assumptions that each
program elicits a specific, isolated spending preference response, we argue that orientations towards social spending
are more diffuse and generalized than age-based, single-issue
analyses suggest (see also Street and Cossman 2006). People
do not form preferences for social spending in a programmatic vacuum, but rather express support for related types of
spending in a more general way. Consequently, considering
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spending domains representing similar social programs will
be more useful than single-issue analyses for understanding
citizens' orientations towards social spending.
Our research uses two analytic devices to explore the
complex interrelationships among individuals' preferences
for social spending, age, and other temporal influences. First,
we conduct theoretically informed factor analyses of General
Social Survey (GSS) social spending items to verify hypothesized spending preference domains. Three domains-universal, targeted, and infrastructure-are conceptualized based on
assumptions from critical gerontology and political economy
about how "average citizens" might perceive benefits derived
from each spending domain. Because factor analysis demonstrates that hypothesized social spending preferences cluster
predictably, we can use the resulting domains to analyze generalized social spending preference structures ratler than considering programs in isolation. This approach offers a more
holistic analysis of social welfare orientations than does a
program-by-program analytic approach.
Second, we use multiple administrations of the GSS to
construct age groups and birth cohorts to assess potential
temporal influences on orientations towards social spending.
The conventional view that social spending preferences are
exclusively derived from individuals' self-interested behavior is contrasted with the critical life course perspective (see
Williamson, McNamara and Howling 2003 for an excellent
discussion of this topic). This perspective suggests that social
spending often represents broad-based interests that can be
interpreted, in part, as altruistic orientations toward general
welfare among citizens. Thus, we explore the empirical foundation of a potential "politics of aging" by evaluating levels
of support for social spending domains across age groups,
periods and cohorts. These analyses also allow us to assess the
plausibility of characterizing spending preferences as 'self-interested' or 'altruistic.'
Age and Spending Preferences
Age, if expressed either as a unifying or discriminating factor, matters in the policymaking arena and may be a
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mobilizing influence in political contexts (Silverstein, Angelelli,
and Parrott 2001; MacManus 1996; Rosenbaum and Button
1993). Proponents of the politics of agingposition hold that (old)
age is expressed as political self-interest that inoculates programs such as Social Security and health care against spending
cuts, because they benefit the elderly directly (see Wallace et al.
1991). This model casts elderly Americans as a homogeneous,
political power bloc of almost mythic proportions, winning
political contests that further their own interests at the expense
of other age groups (Howe 1997; Peterson 1994; Preston 1984).
Others reject this attribution of senior power as overly simplified (Williamson et al. 2003; Binstock and Quadagno 2001;
Binstock and Day 1996; Street and Quadagno 1993; Wallace et
al. 1991). Instead, political economists and critical gerontologists focus on historically specific institutions, policy contexts,
and motivations, which differentially empower or constrain
various subgroups of political actors. Such critical perspectives
underscore heterogeneity among elderly Americans-indeed,
among individuals in all age groups-and call into question
whether there is a politics of aging where social spending preferences are concerned (Street and Cossman 2006; Williamson
et al. 2003; Estes 1991). Critical perspectives emphasize instead
how broad-based social spending reflects middle class incorporation (Street 1997; Street and Quadagno 1993) that garners
cross-class and intergenerational political support. In contrast,
narrowly targeted social assistance spending often stigmatizes
beneficiaries and is vulnerable to retrenchment due to sociopolitical cleavages and political unpopularity. Furthermore,
political economists and critical gerontologists argue that
political identities, cleavages, and meanings are historicallyspecific social constructions transformed at the intersection of
social, political, and economic institutions and are not especially conditioned by age or aging (Street and Cossman 2006;
Street 1997; Binstock and Day 1996; Estes et al 1996; Street and
Quadagno 1993).
Thus, conventional politics of aging and critical life course
perspectives offer competing worldviews for the roles age, selfinterest, and altruism play in the politics of social spending,
and whether spending preferences plausibly apply to single
issue or more generalized spending orientations. A politics of
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aging model regards elderly citizens as an effective political
force, self-interested enough as Social Security and Medicare
beneficiaries to protect those programs and advance their
own welfare, while simultaneously begrudging support for
policies addressing the needs of citizens of other ages (Lamm
1999; Howe 1997; Peterson 1994). In contrast, the critical life
course perspective emphasizes how broad-based programs
like public pensions and public education generate political
support among diverse groups of citizens. It assumes that political actors are complex, so that beyond self-interest they may
also express other-regarding preferences-altruism-and be
willing to share the costs of social programs, even when spending has no obvious direct benefit to them (Street and Cossman
2006; Metz 2002; Street and Ginn 2001; Walker and Naegele
1999; Street and Quadagno 1993; Minkler 1991).
Individualists and Collectivists
The contrasting views of conventional and political
economy models of social spending preferences embody fundamentally different moral economy assumptions-differences in worldviews and in collectively shared moral assumptions underlying norms of reciprocity in which the American
economy and political processes are grounded (Minkler and
Cole 1997). The individualist or "exchange value" form of moral
economy views reciprocity as appropriately bounded within
kin relations and grounded in market exchange for "advantage
or profit in individual transactions" (Hendricks and Leedham
1991:56), consistent with the self-interest assumptions of conventional politics of aging analyses. The individualist tradition regards general welfare derived from market outcomes
and within families as almost always superior to any type of
state provision. Social spending beyond targeted, subsistence
poverty relief to alleviate market failures is regarded as undesirable because it risks undermining individual freedom,
work effort, and family values. Rather than collective provision through welfare state programs, adherents to an individualist moral economy generally favor social welfare and
public goods derived through individual thrift and voluntary
arrangements. The core focus of the individualist orientation is
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on political actors motivated by self-interest.
Critical gerontologists and political economists regard the
individualist perspective as an overly simplified framework
for understanding the intersection between age and politics.
This more critical life course perspective attributes political
support for social programs-whether for a specific one like
Social Security, or for more diffuse spending on general categories of education and health care-to much broader bases than
merely age-based or self-interested ones. The collectivist moral
economy is grounded in meeting human needs through social
arrangements created to maximize life chances for all members
of society over time, given resource constraints (Minkler and
Cole 1997; Hendricks and Leedham 1991). Collectivist orientations are expressed in broad-based, universalist social policies
that generate what political economists call middle class incorporation (Street 1997; Street and Quadagno 1993). Because universalist programs promote the social welfare of wide swaths
of citizens and not just the poor, middle class stakeholders
ensure robust political support, upholding citizens' rights to
social welfare. Thus, the collectivist perspective emphasizes
that both individually-motivated and shared interests, but
not just self-interest alone, shape spending preferences over
the life course. Within this framework, self-interest may still
operate as concern for one's own welfare and a preference for
policies that advance it, but in tandem with altruism (as we use
the term in this research), expressed as a collective concern that
others' needs be met and the willingness to support spending
that advances general welfare.
Single Issues versus Social Spending Domains
Many social commentators and analysts focus on popular
support for single social policies, e.g., support for spending
on public education, cutting welfare spending, expanding
Medicare, etc. However, Williamson et al (2003) underscore
how important it is to understand both fact and framing to
untangle the foundations of age-based political debates. When
considering social spending priorities in isolation, the logic
that age may predict support for particular types of spending seems apparent. For example, a common anecdote is that
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elderly voters defeat school bond and school-supporting tax
initiatives in local elections (see Minkler 1991; Rosenbaum and
Button 1989). Younger adults (particularly college age individuals and parents of school age children) might plausibly be
expected to favor more education spending than older adults,
or to withhold support for Social Security because of their
youth.
Clearly, such age-based explanations offer a glimpse into
conceivable reasons for individuals' preference formation for
social spending (but see Street and Cossman 2006). However,
such program-by-program consideration treats social spending as radically-separable single issues, whereas we argue
that preference structures for spending are expressed in less
divisible ways. General orientations of citizens towards social
welfare, we argue, falls within distinct domains of social
spending preferences. We identify three such domains based
on insights from the moral economy framework in critical
gerontology and informed by expectations about preferences
associated with structural components of social welfare programs from political economy.
The universal domain includes broad-based types of social
spending-income security, health care and education. While
universal domain components might potentially provide direct
benefits to individuals of different ages, or differing positions
in the life course, we expect them to be conceptually linked
because of their important contribution to general welfare. We
hypothesize that what we call the targeted domain will encompass spending mainly perceived as benefiting individuals who
most citizens regard as "other"-that is, individuals perceived
as different from many members of the dominant community.
Because many in the general population perceive assistance
programs as disproportionately targeted toward poor and/
or minority Americans (Gilens 1996) and unlikely to benefit
non-poor/majority individuals directly, we expect the targeted spending domain to reflect the sense of "otherness" that
poverty-based programs typically engender. The infrastructure
domain encompasses spending on communities and the built
environment belonging in the public domain. Because benefits
from infrastructure domain components are very diffuse and
less divisible than the universal or targeted factors, this domain
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has no obvious age-related appeal.
Data and Methods
We use data from three waves of the General Social Survey
(1988, 1994 and 2000) that represent relatively distinctive political periods. The six-year intervals allow us to create theoretically relevant age groups for analysis. Conducted by the
National Opinion Research Center, the GSS samples a representative population of English-speaking, non-institutionalized individuals (Davis and Smith 1998) and is the largest sociological survey in the U.S. Data from repeated surveys allows
for examination of variations in support for social spending
domains by age, cohort and period. Because the discrete effects
of age, cohort and period are difficult to disentangle (Glenn
2003; Alwin 2003), we caution readers that our discussion of
temporal influences should be interpreted as suggestive, not
causal.
Age Groups and Cohorts
Table 1 shows the composition of age groups and cohorts
used in subsequent descriptive analyses. The six-year age
groups at each GSS administration (1988, 1994, and 2000)
were combined into cohorts when social spending preferences
were measured for at least two consecutive survey periods
for each group. For example, the 1959 to 1964 birth cohort includes those aged 24-29 in 1988, linked with individuals aged
30-35 in 1994, linked with individuals aged 36-41 in 2000 (the
cohort highlighted on the diagonal in Table 1). Consequently,
the analyses include 11 cohorts, since the youngest age group
(18-23) in 2000 and the oldest age group (78+) in 1988 had no
counterparts in adjacent survey administrations.
Social Spending Domains
We used nine GSS social spending items to construct three
theoretically derived social spending domains. We expected
three GSS items-Social Security, health care, and education,
broad-based spending that directly benefits individuals-to
comprise the universal domain. GSS items assessing support
for social assistance and programs providing benefits mostly
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to perceived "others"-assistance to cities (often regarded as
disproportionately benefiting urban minority populations),
welfare, and assistance to blacks-were expected to cluster as
the targeteddomain. Finally, the infrastructuredomain was expected to comprise GSS items relating to spending on parks, public
transportation, and roads, which contribute to general welfare
but which are not divisible into individual direct benefits.
Table 1.
Sample Size and Cohort Construction
by Age and Year of GSS Interview
1988
1994
2000
78+
156
135
72-77
85
162
150
66-71
116
180
166
60-65

119

175

206

54-59

85

226

312

48-53
42-47

92
157

311
372

391
387

36-41

193

415

356

30-35
24-29
18-23

195
215
141

[_468
349
172

311
215

1

The GSS social spending item format is to ask whether
the government is spending (1) too much money, (2) too little
money, or (3) just about the right amount on each type of social
spending. Support for each item is measured conservatively,
with only respondents answering that the government was
spending "too little money" scored as supporting that item.
That is, only respondents indicating insufficient spending on
an item were scored as supporting it, essentially removing the
effects of inertia ('just about right' responses) from the analysis. Because the risk of this approach is to understate rather
than overstate support, the analytic trends shown here represent particularly robust relationships.
Constructingthe Social Spending Domains
To construct the spending domains, each of the nine social
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spending items was dichotomized and pooled across time
to increase sample size. Analyses prior to pooling show
Table 2. Factor Analysis with Principle Components Analysis
Performed on Nine Items Measuring Attitudes Toward Social
Spending in 1988, 1994 and 2000 Pooled Data from the General
Social Survey.
Universal
Education

0.65

Health and Health Care

0.74

Social Security

0.69

Targeted

Race and Race Relations

0.83

Cities

0.66

Welfare

0.47

Infrastructure

Roads

0.65

Mass Transportation

0.70

Parks

0.64

Eigenvalue

1.45

1.33

1.31

% of Variance Explained

48.21

44.63

43.77

From the General Social Survey (1988-2000), the questions were
worded as follows: "We are faced with many problems in this country,
none of which can be solved easily or inexpensively. I'm going to
name some of these problems, and for each one I'd like you to tell me
whether you think we're spending too much money on it, too little
money, or about the right amount. Are we spending too much money,
too little money, or the right amount on..."

similar variance explained in each of the three GSS administrations for each of the three factors, indicating internal stability over time. Each respondent reporting that the government
spent "too little money" on a particular item was categorized
as supporting the item and scored 1; non-supporters reported
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that the government spent "about the right amount" or "too
much money" and scored zero on the item. Factor analysis
conducted using SPSS statistical software confirmed that the
nine GSS social spending items clustered into the three conceptually distinct social spending domains-universal, infrastructure, and targeted-shown in Table 2.
Universal Domain

The universal domain reflects broad-based benefits that
political economists describe as fostering middle class incorporation, creating political sustenance for this kind of social
welfare spending. Because the universal domain represents
large, widely available programs-education, health care, and
Social Security-it benefits people from all income brackets,
and not just the poor. Clustering preferences for these items
result in confirmatory factor loadings from 0.65 to 0.74 and
explain 48 percent of the variance in these measures.
Targeted Domain

Poverty-based programs (even programs misperceived as
such) simply do not derive the same broad-based support as
the more politically popular universal programs (Quadagno
1994). The targeted domain-spending on cities, assistance
for blacks, and welfare-reflects spending that many regard
as targeted towards individuals perceived as "other kinds" of
people, different or distant from the majority culture (Gilens
1996; Quadagno 1994). Many Americans have systematic
misapprehensions about such programs, either because they
are misinformed about the costs, benefits and structures of
programs, because they perceive most recipients to be race/
ethnic minorities, or to be "work-shy." Age does not seem to
be a plausible catalyst for orientations towards the targeted
domain; rather, issues of class (income) and race/ethnicity
seem more likely to inform targeted domain spending preferences. Clustering the three GSS items representing the targeted
domain results in strong factor loadings (from 0.47 to 0.83); the
domain explains 45 percent of the variance in responses to its
component items.
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InfrastructureDomain
Governments spend on a variety of programs besides those
that deliver direct and divisible benefits to individuals. Among
programs that benefit the general welfare through social investments in public infrastructure are spending on mass
transportation, parks, and roads. We expected preferences for
infrastructure spending to differ from the universal and targeted domains, since benefits of the infrastructure domain are
diffuse and indirect. Confirmatory factor analysis on the three
GSS spending items shows that they load on one factor with
scores ranging from 0.64 to 0.70. The resulting infrastructure
domain explains 44 percent of the variance in the responses
to GSS items asking about spending for mass transportation,
parks, and roads.
CalculatingDomain Factor Scores
We next created a single score for each respondent for each
of the three domains. Respondents who support increased
spending on all three GSS items comprising a particular
domain were considered 100 percent supportive and are scored
1. Respondents supporting two of three items comprising the
domain were considered 66 percent supportive and are scored
0.66 and so on. We use these scores to analyze the relationships
between each of the domains and the age groups and cohorts.
Because component variables load on each domain similarly
for all age groups and cohorts, we are confident that the universal, infrastructure, and targeted domains represent distinctive clusters of spending preferences among GSS respondents,
regardless of age group or cohort. To demonstrate how age
group, period, and cohort membership influenced generalized
social spending orientations, we present a simple tabular presentation of age, period, and cohort trends for the three spending domains (see Alwin 2003; Alwin and Scott 1996).
Findings
Table 3 shows the percent of GSS respondents supporting
each spending domain by age group, period, and cohort. The
youngest age groups report the highest support for increased
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Table 3. Percent Support for Three Social Spending Domains by
Age, Period and Cohort
Panel One
Age Group
18-23
24-29
30-35
36-41
42-47
48-53
54-59
60-65
66-71
72-77
78+

Universal
62.3
68.8
70.0
68.9
69.4
66.7
66.9
60.4
59.2
59.2
52.3

Targeted
42.5
43.8
40.1
39.2
39.2
40.2
36.9
30.8
31.8
32.6
31.5

Infrastructure
34.0
33.0
35.2
36.3
36.2
38.7
37.2
34.5
37.8
40.2
39.5

Panel Two
GSS Year
1988
1994
2000

Universal
64.7
62.7
69.6

Targeted
40.2
36.7
39.4

Infrastructure
33.2
36.6
37.2

Panel Three
Cohort
1911-1916
1917-1922
1923-1928
1929-1934
1935-1940
1941-1946
1947-1952
1953-1958
1959-1964
1965-1970
1971-1976
Total

Universal
52.0
56.1
60.5
59.6
64.6
67.2
69.8
68.2
69.6
68.7
67.5
65.8

Targeted
32.5
31.5
32.8
33.3
35.3
36.5
40.2
39.9
40.5
42.7
43.4
38.4

Infrastructure
38.3
38.3
38.7
35.9
35.9
38.6
36.1
36.8
35.2
33.7
33.9
36.1

47.8

43.8

43.3

% of Variance Explained

From the General Social Survey (1988-2000), see page 82 for wording.
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universal spending, but all age groups are more supportive of
universal spending than not. The majority of respondents in
each age group supports universal spending, ranging from 52
to 70 percent across the groups, with a 66 percent average level
of support (Table Three, Panel One). Small numbers of respondents in the over 78 age group suggest that their outlier status
may be noise due to small sample size (see Table 3 Panel 1);
nonetheless they report levels of support substantially below
other age groups. When considering all respondents under
78 years of age, there is only a 10 percent range in the level of
support for the universal domain.
Panel 2 in Table 3 shows variation in support for increased
universal spending across the three periods of GSS administration. Support was at 65 percent overall in 1988, dipping
slightly in 1994 when the incoming Republican Congress advocated cuts in all social programs. By 2000, support recovered to about 70 percent.
Panel 3 in Table 3 shows variation in support for universal spending across the cohorts we constructed (refer to Table
1). Cohort differences in spending preferences may occur
because unique age/period interactions are expressed in the
cohort construct (for example, attaining adulthood during
the Depression, coming of age as part of the leading edge of
the Baby Boom generation, etc.) (Elder 1994, 1985). There is
a linear pattern of low levels of support for universal spending among the earliest born cohorts to higher levels of support
among more recently born cohorts. This generalized preference structure of higher relative levels of support for universal domain spending among the more recently born cohorts
holds whether considered as discrete programs (see Street and
Cossman 2006) or as a generalized social spending domain.
Support for increased targeted and infrastructure spending are also shown by age, period and cohort in Table 3. The
average levels of support for increased spending in both the
targeted and infrastructure domains are similar, and are substantially lower than for the universal spending. The patternsof
variation among age, period, and cohort are similar for universal and targeted spending, but with levels of support substantially lower for the targeted domain. In contrast, age, period,
and cohort patterns of support are distinctively different for
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infrastructure spending when compared to both targeted and
universal spending.
Support for targeted spending peaks among young respondents (age 24-29), remains at stable levels before dropping off
around middle age (age 48-52), then dips even more steeply
for respondents over age 60. Support for targeted spending
declines overall in 1994, a pattern similar to the suppression
of support for universal spending in the same period. By 2000,
support for targeted spending rebounds to its 1988 level. Panel
3 Table 3 indicates higher levels of targeted spending support
for more recently born cohorts and lower levels for earlier born
cohorts, a cohort preference pattern similar to the universal
spending domain.
Levels of support for infrastructure spending vary only 7
percent across age groups. Unlike the universal and targeted
domains, where support was highest among younger respondents and lowest among older ones, the age pattern of preference is reversed for infrastructure spending. Individuals aged
24-29 express the least willingness to spend more (33 percent)
and respondents aged 72-77 express the highest levels of infrastructure spending support (40 percent). Examination for
period effects shows that infrastructure spending support was
stable or rose over the entire 12-year period, unlike the midpoint dips in support for additional universal and targeted
spending. With only a 5 percent difference across cohort preferences in infrastructure spending, the cohort pattern of the
earlier born cohorts being more supportive of infrastructure
spending than more recently born ones is a small but interesting departure from the cohort patterns observed in the other
two spending domains.
Table 4 disaggregates support for universal, targeted and
infrastructure spending in three ways (see Alwin and Scott
[1996] for a discussion of this analysis technique). Panel 1
shows the percent supporting increased spending within each
domain, at each GSS period, for each age group. Panel 2 shows
change in percent supporting increased spending between GSS
years. Intra-cohort change is displayed in Panel 3. In Table 4,
net change by period-the difference in support for increased
spending between a given age group at time "one" and the age
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Table 4. Percentage supporting increased spending in each social spending domain
by age group and year.
Age
18-23
24-29
30-35
36-41
42-47
48-53
54-59
60-65
66-71
72-77
78+
Total

Universal Spending Domain
19881994
1.4
2.6
1.6
5.0
0.0
-5.7
-4.8
-11.2
-9.4
-10.5
-17.0
-2.0

66.0
67.4
61.3
62.9
65.6
70.2
65.3
67.0
76.3
63.5
68.5
69.3
63.8
63.8
69.8
63.9
58.2
65.5
68.0
63.2
70.9
61.0
49.8
65.5
66.7
57.3
63.5
65.9
55.4
66.7
70.6
53.7
48.4
64.7
62.7
69.6
Targeted Spending Domain
18-23
41.2
45.7
36.2
4.5
24-29
38.5
34.5
37.2
-4.0
30-35
37.6
36.1
41.4
-1.6
36-41
39.3
33.3
37.6
-6.0
42-47
39.4
35.4
38.9
-4.0
48-53
41.4
28.9
35.7
-12.5
54-59
45.6
29.6
32.7
-16.1
60-65
40.8
33.7
23.9
-7.1
66-71
35.5
31.8
32.7
-3.6
72-77
55.3
30.4
28.6
-24.9
78+
39.0
34.3
33.3
-4.7
Total
40.2
36.7
39.4
-3.5
Infrastructure Spending Domain
18-23
37.7
36.3
33.3
-1.4
24-29
30.8
33.5
33.3
2.7
30-35
32.5
38.3
29.3
5.8
36-41
32.2
34.6
35.4
2.4
42-47
32.9
36.9
38.8
4.0
48-53
33.1
40.4
35.4
7.3
54-59
35.6
38.3
41.7
2.7
60-65
29.0
32.6
34.0
3.6
66-71
32.7
30.8
38.2
-1.8
72-77
47.4
33.3
38.4
-14.1
78+
31.1
38.2
39.7
7.0
Total
33.2
36.6
37.2
3.4

Social Change
199419882000
2000
-6.2
-4.8
4.6
7.3
9.3
10.9
0.8
5.8
6.0
6.1
7.3
1.6
7.7
2.9
15.7
4.5
6.2
-3.2
11.2
0.7
-5.2
-22.2
6.9
4.9

Intracohort Change
1988- 199419881994
2000
2000
-0.4
4.0
3.2
0.3
-5.6
-0.7
-18.2
-3.8
-11.2
-12.3

2.8
10.7
2.3
1.3
1.7
12.7
2.3
13.7
9.4
-7.0

10.3
6.3
4.5
2.0
7.1
1.6
-4.5
5.6

-9.5
2.7
5.3
4.3
3.5
6.8
3.2
-9.8
0.8
-1.8
-1.0
2.7

-5.0
-1.3
3.8
-1.7
-0.5
-5.6
-12.9
-16.9
-2.8
-26.7
-5.6
-0.8

-6.7
-2.4
4.3
-3.9
-10.5
-11.8
-11.9
-9.0
-5.1
-20.9

-8.5
6.9
1.5
5.6
0.3
3.8
-5.6
-1.1
-3.3
3.0

0.2
-0.9
1.3
-3.6
-6.7
-17.4
-13.0
-12.2

-3.0
-0.2
-9.1
0.8
1.9
-5.0
3.4
1.4
7.3
5.1
1.5
0.7

-4.3
2.5
-3.3
3.2
5.9
2.3
6.1
5.0
5.5
-9.0
8.5
4.0

-4.2
7.5
2.1
4.7
7.5
5.2
-3.0
1.8
0.7
-9.2

-3.0
-4.3
-2.9
4.3
-1.5
1.2
-4.2
5.6
7.6
6.3

-8.4
4.6
6.3
3.3
8.7
0.9
2.6
9.4

Social Change= net change (percent difference) Intracohort Change - net change (percent difference)
Source: General Social Survey 1988-2000
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group following it in time at time "two"-can be read across
the rows of the table. Change in spending preferences among
cohort members are read by following the patterns in the intracohort change panel, highlighted in the table.
Broadly speaking, support for increased universal spending is in the 60 to 70 percent range, while support for targeted
and infrastructure spending hover around 40 percent. Domainby-domain preferences are fairly consistent over time when
all age groups are examined-total social change is generally
below 5 percent for any given time period (except the universal domain which had a slightly higher 7 percent increase
from 1994 to 2000). Intra-cohort change plays a larger role in
evolving support for spending in each domain. This indicates
that cohort effects-the combination of individual experiences
and their unique intersections with history-likely condition
support for additional social spending, regardless of domain.
When disaggregated by age, social change associated with
support for increased universal spending is large and negative
between 1988 and 1994, but counterbalanced by an even larger
and positive change between 1994 and 2000. Only two age
groups stand out much from the others. Net social change for
universal spending is relatively large for the 30-35 age group
(+11 percent), while support among respondents in the over-78
age group declined 22 percent over the twelve years. However,
it is important to keep in mind that the small sample size for
the oldest age group may bias these observations.
Overall, support for more targeted spending changes less
than 1 percent over the twelve-year period, but is the most variable of the three domains across the age groups. For all but the
youngest groups, support for targeted spending droppedbetween 2 and 25 percent-from 1988 to 1994. From 1994
to 2000, most age groups' levels of support for the targeted
domain rebounded, with a slight decline in overall support observed over the entire 12-year period.
There is little social change over twelve years in overall
support for increased infrastructure spending. Disaggregated
by age group, net social change for increased infrastructure
spending trends positive, about 5 percent higher over the
entire period. Generally, among younger age groups there
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were small decreases in support for increased infrastructure
spending, despite the slight upward trend in overall support
for infrastructure spending.
In terms of intracohort change, the targeted factor is most
volatile, having the highest levels of change in support for
increased spending, followed by infrastructure and universal domains respectively. Further, the pattern of intracohort
change in support for increased infrastructure spending was
quite different from either the universal or targeted domains.
Intracohort decreases in support for both the targeted and universal domains appear to represent the effects of earlier born
cohorts moving through the age structure.
Discussion
These analyses explore some of the complexities of the interrelationships among age groups, over time, and between
cohorts for the generalized spending orientations we designated as universal, targeted and infrastructure domains. While
disaggregation of the sort presented here cannot answer definitively which temporal influences-age or period, or their
interaction as cohort effects-condition social spending preferences, the data are suggestive. Most evidence refutes explanations dependent on simple self-interest, single-issue orientations, or conventional politics of aging explanations for social
spending preferences. More persuasive is a critical life course
framework that focuses on general orientations towards
related types of spending represented by three conceptually
consistent domains. Such a critical framework recognizes orientations that can also be interpreted as altruistic or collective,
as a partial explanation for the robustness of support for social
spending preferences.
Whether each component item is considered in isolation or
whether social spending domains are analyzed, we find little
empirical support for a politics of aging model of spending
preferences (see also Street and Cossman 2006). For such an
interpretation to be convincing, self-interested orientations
among the elderly towards social spending-high levels of
support for programs such as Social Security and health care
and low levels of support for programs of little potential benefit
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to them, like education-would be operative. What we find
instead is consistently lower levels of support for direct social
spending among the oldest GSS respondents when compared
to younger ones, regardless of the specific GSS item or spending domain we considered. Support for increased spending in
both the universal and targeted domains tends to peak in the
middle of the age distribution and decline thereafter. This is true
despite the heavier 'weight' in the universal factor of programs
presumed to be of most direct benefit to elderly Americansmore spending on Social Security and health care.
An argument could be made that including education in the
universal domain masks high levels of self-interested health
and Social Security spending support among the elderly, tempered by presumably lower levels of support for education in
the universal measure score. However, that conventional assumption is precisely opposite the empirically derived rank
order of spending preferences expressed by elderly GSS respondents. They, like GSS subjects of other ages, report most
support for education spending and least support for Social
Security (Street and Cossman 2006) among the universal
domain components. In fact, the broad similarity among all
age groups' patterns of support imparts confidence that the
universal domain is conceptually cohesive.
'Altruism' as we loosely use it in this context, represents
a willingness to spend more on general welfare of no obvious
direct benefit to individuals. In this sense, altruism does not
decline monotonically with age as a politics of aging model
would suggest; instead, the youngest and oldest age groups,
likely having fewer economic resources, are somewhat less
likely than mid-life individuals in their prime earning years
(ages 24 to 59) to support increased spending in any domain.
This can more plausibly be interpreted as the age-conditioned
life course effect of needing to shepherd limited resources at
particular life stages, rather than an age effect.
All age groups' levels of support for more universal and
targeted spending appear similarly influenced by broad socioeconomic conditions and political trends, albeit from different
starting points. No age groups were immune to influences in
the political environments surrounding social welfare-particularly for universal and targeted spending-as support

92
Journal of Sociology & Social Welfare
dipped during the mid-1990s when the Republican Revolution
advocated less government spending, when "welfare as we
know it" ended, and when the Clinton Administration health
reforms failed. If Callahan (2005:703) is correct, that we are
"heading back to the age of rugged individualism and survival of the fittest," we would expect when the 2006 wave of
GSS data becomes available that a period effect of suppressed
targeted and universal spending support shaped by the relentlessly conservative policy environment of recent years will
again be observed.
Age, period, and cohort effects are notoriously difficult
to untangle, because cohort effects express the unique interaction between age and period (Alwin 2003; Glenn 2003).
Consequently, our results are only suggestive. Still, bivariate
findings indicate that earlier born cohorts have social spending orientations less supportive, on average, of increased social
spending when compared to more recently born cohorts. Such
distinctive cohort orientations may occur because more recently born cohorts take for granted, or perceive they depend on
more, mature welfare state programs that were less developed
or available to earlier born cohorts. Earlier born cohorts' orientations may reflect their unique life experiences of limited
social spending early in life, survival throughout the privations of the Depression and World War II, combined with
lower expectations of costs for public provision of education,
health, and pensions, expectations shaped before the maturation of the U.S. welfare state. A notable exception to the trend
of earlier born cohorts being less supportive of social spending
is their higher levels of support for the infrastructure domain
compared to more recently born cohorts.
This finding seems paradoxical, given the earliest born
cohorts' propensity for substantially lower spending preference levels in other domains. But their early life experiences
may offer insight into otherwise surprisingly high levels and
distinctive patterns of support for infrastructure spending.
During their young lives, Depression-era public investment
in massive public works projects provided jobs and enriched
the fabric of public life: creating public buildings, schools, libraries, dams, bridges and highway systems. Tangible benefits
of investment experienced over a lifetime, the employment
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infrastructure spending provided in their younger years, or a
perception among the earliest born cohorts that infrastructure
spending might be a better investment than direct spending on
individuals-all are potential cohort-related explanations for
high levels of support for the infrastructure domain. It seems
unlikely that age or aging per se shaped such preferences for
social spending; rather life course experiences expressed as
cohort differences seem a better fit.
Observing patterns of cohort spending preferences is informative for other reasons. The peaks and valleys in average
levels of support among age groups are smoothed when period
and age are observed simultaneously as cohort patterns. This
finding undermines a politics of aging explanation for the robustness of age-based social programs, since the age "effects"
necessary to support a politics of aging model are not robust
enough to thrive once there is a "control" for possible period
effects that reflect broad social changes. Both the universal and
targeted domains have components that appear in conventional welfare state analyses (i.e., programs offering direct benefits
to individuals rather than diffuse contributions to society as a
whole, such as the infrastructure domain). The earliest born
cohorts are simply less supportive of direct individual welfare
state benefits than are more recently born cohorts, regardless
of program or domain considered. Despite their reliance on
public pension and health care spending, the earliest born
cohorts were least supportive of universal domain spending
from which they could gain the most direct benefit. Whether
because earlier born cohorts cleave to values of rugged individualism and expect individuals and families to provide for
themselves, or because modest expectations of social spending
have been largely met at current levels, patterns of age group
and cohort preferences are at odds with a convincing politics
of aging explanation to account for the robustness of programs
like Social Security and Medicare.
Conclusion
Conventional political analyses assume that interest formation for age-based social programs is straightforward: Social
Security and Medicare benefits create material and political
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reasons for elderly people to act in self-interest to maintain or
increase their claim on benefits, but because education spending does not benefit them directly, they would rather not. The
politics of aging-outcomes of political contests strongly influenced by elderly people-is consistent with individualist
moral economy precepts. Age and self-interest in program
benefits determine political identity, implying homogeneous
age interests consistent with a welfare state for the elderly,
largely determined by the elderly.
Our findings contradict the notion of a politics of aging.
A conventional politics of aging should yield more support
among Americans 65 and older than for younger age groups
for the universal domain with its Social Security component. It
did not. One might argue that including education and health
in the universal domain 'trumps' the potential self-interested
Social Security age effects that could be hypothesized for that
domain. But elderly Americans' program preferences, examined on a program-by-program basis, are higher for spending
on education than for Social Security (Street and Cossman,
2006). The oldest age groups report lower levels of support for
all direct social spending, whether they stand to benefit disproportionately or not, including for discrete programs like Social
Security. Younger GSS respondents express higher levels of
Social Security support than older ones. Older people seem to
embrace the ideal of American self-sufficiency-more willing
than younger age groups to invest in infrastructure, but less
likely to support spending that benefits individuals directly
This does not mean that self-interest lacks a role in shaping
spending preferences for elders, or citizens of any other age.
Targeted benefits arise, in part, from self-interest manifested in
the failure of citizens to accomplish crosscutting political alliances that express altruistic preferences for social spending to
meet all citizens' varying needs over the life course. Combined
with the fact that GSS respondents express higher levels of universal domain spending support with its direct, divisible individual benefits, suggests that self-interest is part of the calculus
for preferences-just not the entire story. High levels of support
for the universal domain, with its collective risk-sharing, show
that Americans of various ages can put aside narrowly defined
self-interest, banding together to support programs that share
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risk and rewards broadly, regarding others' financial security
and wellbeing as important as their own. Older people likely
base their preferences on similarly complex sets of criteria as do
other adults, influenced by factors such as political socialization in childhood, socioeconomic status, party identification,
the state of the economy, concerns about law and order, and
affordability, to name a few. An inescapable conclusion is that
interdependence among age groups-the regard grandparents
have for their grandchildren, children for their parents, and
individuals in general for other people-is recognized in the
collectivist moral economy, forming the basis for largely ageirrelevant support of universal social programs. The universal
domain creates solidarity between older and younger citizens
who recognize the need for collective risk sharing in a rapidly
changing political economy.
A more plausible explanation than a radically individualist
perspective is that Americans consider their own needs-selfinterest-alongside those of their fellow citizens and broader
communities-altruism-when they decide on social spending preferences. Our findings suggest that altruism warrants
further exploration as a potential motivation for social spending preferences, rather than conceding explanation to strictly
economic self-interest. An intractable problem of conventional
analyses of citizens' spending preferences is the implicit assumption that self-interest necessarily trumps any other motivation in individual decision-making.
Of course, we would be on shaky ground were we to argue
strongly that because respondents to the GSS survey often
supported increased spending unlikely to benefit them directly, they made these decisions based on altruistic motives.
The fact is that while altruism may be a plausible reason for
particular social spending preferences, so too is self-interest.
Unfortunately, we simply lack the data to discern when either
or both motivations are in play. That would require evidence
of a very different sort from a three part fixed-choice response
to a series of survey questions. What analysts often claim is
objective evidence of self-interest (or what we might want to
call altruism) may be understood quite differently by the subjects of our studies. To this end, researchers should supplement future work with more data about how people deliberate
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and decide which social programs they support.
Older citizens certainly maintain a high political profile.
They are disproportionately likely to participate in electoral
politics. They participate as interest group members to influence policy decisions for outcomes they favor. Yet insofar as
the structure of social spending preferences is concerned, the
evidence we have presented undermines a politics of aging hypothesis as an adequate explanation for the popularity of programs for elderly citizens. This does not mean that age interests are entirely insignificant, or that they are undifferentiated.
But neither do age interests appear central to expressed preferences for social spending. A critical life course perspective recognizes that age-based political interests are historically contingent, shaped by position in the life course, conditioned by
a variety of other statuses and constrained by policy legacies,
political culture, and changing socioeconomic conditions. Age
and self-interest, as political organizational principles in isolation, appear to offer less compelling explanations than a more
holistic approach to unpacking the myriad influences on social
spending preferences. We offer as a corrective the recognition
that individuals are likely motivated by the combined influences of their complex lives moving through time (cohort effects)
when they decide what types of social spending they prefer.
Altruism should be considered as an additional factor when
assessing how the politics of social spending are shaped.
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